In the 1950s and 1960s rapid advances in electronics transformed bugs and made them much easier to plant and conceal. 9 The development of the transistor enabled intelligence agencies to miniaturize radio transmitters and reduce their power consumption. As batteries also shrank in size, it became possible to build smaller, battery powered bugs that contained their own transmitters. These new bugs did not need wires to transmit the signal or carry power and could be quickly installed, either through breaking into buildings or by agents within the embassy staff. In Moscow, it was comparatively simple for the KGB to plant these new, small bugs because Western states employed Soviet citizens as ancillary staff in their embassies and diplomats' accommodation. A branch of the Soviet Foreign Ministry provided embassies with interpreters, clerks, messengers, cleaners, cooks and drivers. 10 Many of these workers were actually KGB intelligence officers or informants and, although they were denied access to the more sensitive parts of an embassy such as the ambassador's office and the cipher room where messages were encrypted and sent as telegrams, they had ample opportunity to place and maintain bugs.
11 Miniaturized bugs could also be concealed within objects sent into an embassy. For example, in the 1960s the CIA managed to insert two listening devices into the legs of a desk before it was delivered to the Soviet embassy in Amman, Jordan. 12 The desk was placed in the ambassador's office, allowing the CIA to eavesdrop on his morning staff meetings.
There were more exotic methods of eavesdropping, pioneered by the Soviets, which relied on beaming microwaves, infra-red light or lasers at the target building. 13 A passive cavity resonator could be secretly installed in an embassy and would act like a microphone and transmitter when a microwave beam was directed at it from outside. The return signal would be modulated by voices within the room and these modulations could be picked up as words on a receiver. An infrared beam or laser focused on embassy windows could detect the subtle vibrations in the glass caused by human voices, although there were problems in making these types of microphones work. The CIA developed laser microphones but they only functioned well in the United States and, curiously, West Africa.
14 Once bugs were in place and operating, surveillance teams could collect a wide variety of information from diplomatic premises. Most obviously, they could pick up valuable diplomatic intelligence by eavesdropping on the unguarded conversations of diplomats and listening to them dictate telegrams, letters and dispatches to their foreign ministries. Similarly, spying on military and commercial attachés provided military and economic intelligence. Audio surveillance also had an important counter-intelligence function. Soviet Bloc and Western embassies often had a complement of intelligence officers who masqueraded as diplomats and tried to gather either human intelligence or signals intelligence. 15 The American embassy in Moscow contained both CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) personnel. 16 Bugs in an embassy could help identify these intelligence officers, expose their methods and sources and enable the local authorities to take counter-action.
In addition, bugging produced leads for other intelligence operations. Listening devices in diplomats' accommodation revealed people's potential weaknesses, exposing unhappy marriages, homosexual inclinations, money problems or doubts about their own government. Intelligence agencies could ruthlessly exploit these weaknesses to recruit diplomats as agents, through blackmail, bribery or ideological appeals. To give an example, in the early 1960s microphones in the apartment of the French Air Attaché in Moscow, Colonel Louis Guibaud, showed that he frequently quarrelled with his wife. 17 Consequently he was targeted by the KGB, which lured him into an affair with a female KGB agent and then tried to blackmail him. This type of information gathering was most likely the primary purpose behind bugging diplomats' domestic conversations. As one former American diplomat who worked at the Moscow Embassy observed: 'very few people would talk to their wives about sensitive political or military information. The value of the listening devices is to get somebody'.
18
Perhaps most importantly, bugging could circumvent or help break the ciphers and codes which protected an embassy's outbound and inbound telegrams, giving access to a greater source of intelligence. This could be done in several different ways. As well as human voices, the noises of the cipher machines themselves could assist cryptanalysis. With rotor cipher machines, bugging could pick up the sounds of the operator setting the rotors before beginning transmissions. By examining these sounds, cryptanalysts could work out the initial setting of the rotors and attack the cipher. The British Comint agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) used this technique to break Egyptian ciphers in 1956 after bugging the cipher room of the Egyptian embassy in London. 21 More generally, the NSA and GCHQ discovered in the 1950s that cipher machines produced compromising acoustic and electromagnetic emanations, phenomena which acquired the codename Tempest.
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The switches, contacts, relays and other components in cipher machines emitted acoustic energy which could divulge the internal processes of the machine and be analysed to recreate an original plain text message. 23 For example, each individual key on cipher machine keyboard could have a unique acoustic signature allowing the plain text of a message to be 'read' as it was typed into the cipher machine. The NSA found that microphones placed in cipher rooms could accurately capture these faint sounds from cipher machines. An article in an internal NSA journal in 1972 recalled that:
A disturbing discovery was that ordinary microphones, probably planted to pick up conversations in a cryptocenter, could detect machine sounds with enough fidelity to permit exploitation. And such microphones were discovered in Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and, of course, Moscow.
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Potentially then, audio surveillance could be a rich source of information and it is perhaps unsurprising that the Soviet Union continuously tried to 19 Aldrich, GCHQ, p.57. 20 The device, codenamed Buran, did not work in rain or fog but it was able to monitor at a distance discussions in the business office of the embassy. The Soviets went on to use Buran against the British and French embassies.
Once the Soviets had control over Eastern Europe, Western embassies came under attack there as well. In 1956, State Department technicians discovered a partially installed network of microphones in the American embassy in Prague. 31 The Czechs had broken through from a neighbouring building into the embassy's attic and planted bugs in the ceilings of the rooms below.
32 They had also put a listening device in the fireplace of the ambassador. 33 In Hungary, the American legation had workmen re-plaster 25 36 All but three of these discoveries were in the Soviet Bloc.
The report made it plain that the communist states were prolific eavesdroppers but in truth the State Department had still not grasped the full extent of Soviet Bloc operations. In the coming years more audio penetrations would come to light. The British were next to make a major find, slowly uncovering an extensive bugging system in their Moscow embassy. 37 In the mid-1950s a microphone was found in the study of the ambassador, Sir William Hayter. Wiring was also discovered and it was suspected that the Soviet ancillary staff had removed other microphones before they could be detected. In October 1959 a technical officer found three microphones hidden in the high ceilings of offices on the ground floor of the embassy. Two of the microphones were in the former registry but, more seriously, the third one was in a room which had previously been the embassy cipher room. 38 There was also what the ambassador described as 'a most fantastic system of wires', some of which went down a shaft and out underground through the embassy garden to the building next door. 39 An investigation concluded that the Soviets had installed the whole system in World War 2, at some point between October 1941 and 1943 when, because of the German advance, most of the diplomatic corps had been evacuated to the city of Kuibyshev in southern Russia. 40 The Soviets had evidently exploited the diplomats' absence to bug the British and probably other Western embassies.
By this time the Americans had moved out of their wartime embassy building but in doing so they had created fresh opportunities for Soviet eavesdroppers. In May 1953, the United States transferred the embassy chancery from its old location on Mokhovaya Ulitsa to a building on 34 Chaikovskovo Ulitsa. Soviet workmen had altered and renovated the building prior to the diplomats taking occupancy. American security men had been on hand to make sure that the construction workers did not install any microphones in the top floors of the new embassy which would house the most sensitive offices, but control of the site had been astonishingly lax. The Soviets were allowed to cover the building with canvas to block view of the construction and there were no American guards on watch during the night. 41 After the new embassy opened two State Department security technicians swept it and did not detect any concealed microphones, but they warned that bugging remained 'a serious probability' because 'exceedingly clever and effective installations of such equipment could have been made during the construction of the building'. 42 The technicians' fears turned out to be entirely justified but it was over a decade before the bugs were found. In the early 1960s the CIA received separate warnings about the embassy from two disaffected KGB officers: Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko. Golitsyn, who defected to the United States in 1961, claimed that the embassy was bugged. 43 Nosenko secretly met CIA officers in Geneva in 1962 and told them that he had seen transcripts of conversations held in 10 different offices in the Moscow embassy. 44 There was also growing concern about the security of the embassy's communications, so much so that by November 1963 the CIA Moscow station had stopped using the State Department's cipher machine and was instead manually enciphering its telegrams with one-time pads. 45 When Nosenko finally defected in 1964 he was able to identify which embassy offices had bugs and where they were located, prompting a thorough search of the building. 46 Nonetheless, despite the detailed information from Nosenko, State Department technicians had to demolish an office on the 10th floor before they found the first microphone concealed in a plaster cast set 30 centimetres into the wall behind the radiator. 47 Bugs were then discovered behind other radiators in the embassy; in total the technicians extracted 52 microphones, 47 of which were still active. 48 The microphones were in the walls of virtually all of the key offices, including those of the ambassador, the 41 deputy chief of mission and the defence attachés, and in the conference room and the army communications and code centre. 49 There was also a large metal grill set in a ceiling of a room near the State Department communications centre with co-axial cables running off. 50 The eavesdropping system had almost certainly been installed during the renovations in 1953. It was the worst case so far of bugging in an American embassy during the Cold War.
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Nosenko was also aware of a KGB bugging operation against the West German embassy in Moscow and Americans apparently alerted the authorities in Bonn. 52 The West German search for the bugs was interrupted by a Soviet assassination attempt on their sweeper, Horst Schwirkmann, who was injected in the leg with mustard gas while visiting Zagorsky monastery in September 1964, but Germans eventually found over 30 microphones. 53 One of the bugging devices was in the embassy's cipher room. 54 The microphones had been operating since at least the late 1950s and as West Germany only established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1955, the KGB probably installed most of them before the Germans occupied their embassy in Moscow. 55 Chastened by the discoveries in Moscow, the Americans carried out checks on their other embassies in the Soviet Bloc and found that exactly the same security errors had been made in Poland. 56 In September 1963 the United States mission had moved into a new embassy in Warsaw. The building had been built by Polish labourers and again they had been poorly supervised by the embassy security officers and marine guard detachment, allowing the Poles to plant bugs. In October 1964, State Department technicians unravelled a network of 54 bugs in the Warsaw embassy, many of which had been concealed behind radiators similar to Moscow. But the American embassy was not the only Western mission in Poland to suffer from serious security lapses. During the 1960s the British and French also failed to properly oversee the building of diplomatic premises in Warsaw and left themselves open to bugging. In 1965 the British ambassador to Poland discovered that a system of listening devices had been built into his new official residence. 57 When the politician Jo Grimond visited Warsaw a year later, he had to talk to the ambassador in the embassy garden, standing under an umbrella in pouring rain, because that was the only safe place for conversation. 58 French President Charles de Gaulle ceremonially laid the first stone of a new French embassy in Warsaw during a state visit to Poland in 1967 but this illustrious association did not stop the Poles from bugging the building. 59 A sweep by French technicians in 1973 uncovered 42 microphones embedded in the structural work of the embassy.
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Aside from the conventional bugging of embassies in the Soviet Bloc, there was also widespread audio surveillance of diplomats' accommodation and the possible use of more sophisticated bugging methods against the new American embassy in Moscow. The apartments of diplomats were much less heavily protected than embassies and communist intelligence agencies could enter and plant bugs almost at will. Dennis Amy, who was a Security Officer at the British Moscow embassy, had to remove approximately 200 concealed microphones from diplomats' living accommodation in the early 1960s. 61 At around the same time the United States became aware that the Soviets were beaming microwaves at the American embassy in Moscow, focusing on the ambassador's windows and those of the political section. 62 The Americans were uncertain of the purpose behind this activity; some security officials in Washington appeared to believe the Soviets were using the microwaves in the same way as a laser microphone, measuring the minute vibrations of the windowpanes caused by human voices and the noise of typewriters. 63 However, according to the writer Ronald Kessler, American intelligence agencies eventually decided the microwaves were intended to activate passive cavity resonators, similar to the one in the Great Seal, hidden in the new building. 64 Given the history of Soviet bugging operations in the late 1940s, both explanations seem plausible.
It is clear then that in the first half of the Cold War the Soviet Union and its allies had great success in planting bugs in Western diplomatic premises in Moscow, Warsaw and other Soviet Bloc capitals. Yet it would be wrong to see the Americans and British solely as victims of bugging because they too used audio surveillance, although less is known about their operations. The British Security Service (MI5) and American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tried to bug communist diplomatic premises in Britain and the United States but there were fewer opportunities for them to gain access to Soviet installations. Prudently, the USSR staffed all clerical and ancillary posts in its embassies with Soviet nationals and the Soviet missions in London and Washington experienced nothing like the evacuation to Kuibyshev in World War 2. In January 1944, MI5 had no microphones at all in the Soviet London embassy. 65 However, in the early 1950s MI5 managed to bug the Soviet consulate by secretly entering a neighbouring building and inserting a probe microphone into the party wall. 66 The Polish and Hungarian embassies seem to have been attacked in a similar way. From 1954, the FBI began covert embassy penetrations. 67 Known as 'Program C', a special squad broke into diplomatic premises, including Soviet Bloc embassies and consulates in Washington, New York and San Francisco. The FBI officers sought to steal or copy cipher material and plant listening devices, particularly in embassy cipher rooms.
The British and Americans also operated outside their home territory, helping intelligence services in the old Commonwealth and Western Europe to bug diplomatic premises. MI5 officer Peter Wright was involved in a Canadian scheme in 1956 to bug the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. The embassy had been badly damaged in a fire and during the reconstruction work Wright and a unit from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police secretly installed microphones in the building. 68 Later Wright advised the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation on bugging the Soviet embassy in Canberra. 69 In the Netherlands, the CIA and the Dutch Internal Security Service worked together to plant bugs in the Soviet embassy in The Hague. 70 During the 1950s and 1960s the developing world became a new battle ground for American and Soviet eavesdroppers. European decolonization created independent states in Asia and Africa and led to the opening of many new Western and Soviet Bloc embassies, with all the attendant potential for installing bugs. Developing world targets had a particular appeal for the CIA because Soviet Bloc embassies were often less securely protected there than in the United States and Western Europe. 71 Furthermore, in much of Latin America the CIA could count on support from anti-communist, right wing governments. When the Argentines stumbled across a secret American operation to bug the Soviet embassy in Buenos Aires in the 1950s, the Argentine President, Juan Peron, chided the American ambassador, saying that their 'clumsy effort' had almost blown the Argentines' own taps in the embassy. 72 But Peron offered to share the take from the Argentine listening devices with the US, an offer that the Americans gratefully accepted. Cooperation with the Argentines continued into the 1960s with a combined operation to bug the conference room of the Czech embassy in Buenos Aires. 73 The Americans were also able to penetrate Soviet Bloc diplomatic premises in other parts of Latin America. In the early 1950s the CIA installed a bug in the cipher room of the Czech legation in Quito in Ecuador. 74 According to the former CIA officer Philip Agee, in 1966 a CIA team in the Chilean capital, Santiago, was 'honeycombing a new building of the Soviet Mission with listening devices'. 75 In the rest of the developing world the balance of forces was more even and the KGB as well as the CIA was able to eavesdrop on diplomatic premises. For example, the Soviets bugged the American and British embassies in Beirut in the 1960s and the office of the American ambassador in Conakry, Guinea, in 1972. 76 The examples above show that bugging was widespread in the first half of the Cold War, with both sides penetrating embassies and planting bugs. What is less easy to establish is how much useful information Soviet Bloc and Western intelligence agencies obtained from these operations. Well placed bugs did not always yield good intelligence, partly because diplomats could take countermeasures against bugging. The most direct response was to find listening devices and remove them and the British, Americans and Soviets regularly sent teams of technicians to sweep their diplomatic premises. After World War 2, the British Foreign Office initially used engineers from the General Post Office to check its embassies but by the mid-1950s it had a dedicated unit of its own, the Foreign Service Technical Maintenance Services (FSTMS). 77 FSTMS sweepers could locate bugs with electronic equipment, carry out physical searches and scan radio frequencies to see if any bugs were transmitting to listening posts. 78 The problem was that sweeping could not be guaranteed to detect all bugs. Sweeps of the British embassy in Moscow in December 1943 and November 1945 notably failed to find the bugging system that was eventually uncovered in 1959.
The next line of defence was to limit the take from bugging. It might be difficult to stop bugs from being planted in embassies or to find them but diplomats could prevent the eavesdroppers from hearing sensitive conversations or noises. One long practiced technique was to use sound to mask conversations. When staff at the American legation in Bucharest thought their building was bugged in the late 1940s they resorted to holding conversations in the bathroom with the water running to stop themselves from being overheard. 80 After the discovery of the Great Seal device in Spaso House, the Americans and British started to employ sound masking more systematically as a countermeasure. In October 1952 the Foreign Office advised all British ambassadors behind the Iron Curtain to have music playing from a radio or a record player whenever they or their staff were dictating or discussing matters of particular secrecy. 81 A security report on the new American Moscow embassy in July 1953 recommended that its offices be fitted with loudspeakers connected to a central phonograph constantly playing records. 82 Diplomats could then have readily available music whenever they had held classified discussions. The British embassy in Moscow appears to have installed a similar system. 83 Another, comparatively simple, countermeasure was to modify diplomats' practices and behaviour so that they gave away as little information as possible to any listeners. Due to the dangers of 'hot miking', guidance drawn up for British officials stated that telephones should never be installed in cipher rooms and as a general rule be excluded from conference rooms. 84 Officials were also advised not to dictate letters classified as top secret. American diplomats in Moscow took the same type of precautions. The two American Ambassadors in Moscow between 1952 and 1960, Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson, wrote out their most secret messages to Washington by long hand instead of dictating them. 85 When Thompson wished to discuss a sensitive topic with one of his staff they would exchange notes rather than have a conversation. 86 As more listening devices were found, the British and Americans came to see even these countermeasures as insufficient and they decided to create soundproof secure rooms in their Moscow embassies. After the discovery of bugs in the British embassy in 1959, the Foreign Office installed three secure rooms in the building: two for conversations and one for the cipher room. 87 The Americans erected a secure conference room in their embassy in May 1960 and shielded the cipher rooms. 88 These secure rooms, or 'bubbles' as they were called by diplomats, normally consisted of large, soundproof, transparent plastic and aluminium boxes set up on stilts or suspended from the ceiling of empty rooms. 89 A sound machine sometimes acted as a further barrier to eavesdropping inside the bubble -the British embassy in Moscow had the noise of a cocktail party playing continuously. 90 Secure cipher rooms had extra layers of shielding to block electromagnetic Tempest emanations as well as sound. 91 Other NATO allies quickly followed suit and by 1962 the French, West German and Canadian embassies in Moscow all had secure rooms. 92 The Americans and British then rolled out secure rooms to posts in Eastern Europe and other vulnerable locations. 93 By December 1965 the United States had installed acoustically shielded and electronically shielded secure rooms in all of its embassies behind the Iron Curtain. 94 In theory, secure rooms were bug proof. In the 1980s an American security officer claimed that properly constructed and inspected, bubbles were: '100% secure . . . There are certain physical laws that even the Soviets can't violate'. 95 They provided Western diplomats with a safe space in which to carry out confidential activities and missions adapted their security procedures to make full use of them. Diplomats in the American embassy in Moscow dictated sensitive telegrams inside the bubble and used it for their weekly staff meetings, talks with the British, French and West German ambassadors and all conversations relating to CIA activities. 96 John Sager, a CIA officer stationed in Moscow the early 1960s, later recalled that the embassy: 'had an iron-clad rule: No one speaks a word, outside the bubble, that he/she would not want the KGB to hear'. 97 There were other barriers to successful audio surveillance. Bugs sometimes failed to work once they were installed or later broke down. 98 In the late 1960s Czech State Security, the StB, reported that only half of the 78 listening devices it had planted in Western embassies were still working. 99 Sixteen of the 20 StB bugs in the French embassy in Prague were inoperative. Furthermore, there was always a risk that targets would discover bugs and feed them disinformation. The CIA did attempt to exploit listening devices in this way although microphones were frequently ripped out of embassies before the agency had a chance to get access to them. 100 Still, on occasion it was able to use bugs for deception. For example, a microphone was left in the American military attaché's apartment in Prague so that he could supply the listeners with false information. 101 Nevertheless, despite the difficulties in using bugs and the development of countermeasures, audio surveillance of Western embassies in Moscow does seem to have produced valuable diplomatic intelligence for the Soviets in the first two decades of the Cold War. Some of this came from directly eavesdropping on Western diplomats. A good example is the Great Seal device, in place in Spaso House between July 1945 and September 1952. Harriman, who was the American ambassador in Moscow until January 1946, would meet embassy officers and discuss telegrams in his study, oblivious to the fact that the bugged Great Seal on the wall was transmitting his conversations to a Soviet listening post outside.
102 At least some of his successors as ambassador appear to have been equally incautious. Vadim Goncharov, who worked with the listening post team, later claimed that thanks to the Great Seal bug: 'for a long time, our country was able to get specific and very important information which gave us certain advantages in the prediction and performance of world politics in the difficult period of the cold war'. 103 The bugs in the West German embassy in the late 1950s also produced good results. According to Nosenko, every evening the German ambassador would dictate an account of the day's events, including his communications with Bonn and discussions with NATO ambassadors. This was all picked up by the microphones and important items were immediately sent to the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. 104 Probably more significant, however, was the bugging of Moscow embassy cipher rooms because this helped the Soviets to read the diplomatic telegrams of Western states. In interviews with Christopher Andrew, Nosenko and another KGB defector, Pyotr Deryabin, both remembered seeing intercepts of Western traffic, some of which had resulted from KGB bugs in embassies. 105 In September 1945 a Soviet intelligence officer in Istanbul, Konstantin Volkov, had warned British diplomats that the Soviets were reading all cipher traffic between the British embassy in Moscow and London and had been doing so for two and a half years. 106 Years later, MI5 realized that the Soviets had been able to do this because of the bugging system they installed in the cipher room of the British embassy while the diplomats were evacuated to Kuibyshev. 107 After it had returned from Kuibyshev in 1943, the British mission enciphered its telegrams manually with one-time pads, which if used correctly should have been unbreakable. Unfortunately the telegrams were encrypted by two cipher clerks, one of whom routinely read the clear text of messages aloud for the other clerk to convert with a one-time pad. With the microphone in the cipher room, the Soviets were able to simply listen in and record the spoken clear text, giving them the message.
The British embassy's communications still appeared to be vulnerable during the early Cold War despite the installation there of a Rockex cipher machine in July-August 1945. 108 When the microphones were discovered in the embassy in 1959, the bugged room was no longer in use as the cipher room but the British set up a working party under an MI5 chairman to examine the impact of the bugging. 109 In 111 This device transmitted the text of messages as they were typed into the cipher machine and before they were enciphered. By picking up these transmissions the KGB could obtain clear text copies of the embassy's telegrams. As well as providing valuable diplomatic intelligence, these clear texts could be compared with intercepted enciphered telegrams to help break the cipher. It is not known how long the Soviet device was in place -potentially it could have been operating since the mid-1950s.
Overlapping with these operations against the British and West Germans, the KGB had access to American traffic through its bugs in the new American Moscow embassy. A State Department damage assessment undertaken after the microphones were discovered in 1964 concluded that the bugging system had enabled the Soviets to read the Moscow embassy's communications. It reported that: 'the technical investigation suggests that much or all of the traffic was compromised'.
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To make matters worse, the Soviets could also read telegrams between Washington and American embassies in Eastern Europe, which implies that these embassies used the same cryptographic system as Moscow or ones very similar. The judgement of the CIA and NSA in the damage assessment was that:
. . . the Soviets achieved a major intelligence breakthrough, i.e. for a period of years they had the capability to read most, if not all, of our telegraphic messages between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and posts in Eastern Europe.
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Evidence from the Soviet side suggests this judgement was correct. Two Russian archivists, Vitali Afiani and N. Ivanov, have found intercepted 110 Ibid. 111 . . . inadvertently and with characteristic indiscretion and bluster made it clear to Ambassador Foy Kohler during a heated discussion that we had tapped his coded cables. He wanted to confront the ambassador with the fact that we knew that he had personally opposed the delivery of steel tubing from the West for natural gas pipelines. Thus alerted, American intelligence presumably acted, and our information from the US embassy in Moscow was much reduced. 117 Dobrynin's final sentence appears to be an oblique reference to the American dismantling of the bugging system in 1964.
Taken together, it seems that bugging enabled the Soviets to read the Moscow embassy traffic of its principal Cold War enemies: the United States, Britain and West Germany. This was a considerable achievement and it demonstrates the potential power of audio surveillance. It also raises questions about whether intelligence derived from these sources influenced Soviet policy and affected the course of events in the early Cold War. The State Department did consider these issues as part of its damage assessment in 1964. 118 It reviewed all of the telegrams it had exchanged with its Moscow embassy during several Cold War crises and periods of negotiation to determine whether the Soviets might have gained some advantage. However, it proved surprisingly hard to identify instances where a Soviet action could be clearly attributed to an intercepted American telegram. In some cases, like the Suez Crisis of October-November 1956, this may have been because little sensitive material was sent by telegram. After reviewing the relevant cables, the State Department concluded that: 'The telegraphic traffic with Moscow on the Suez Crisis would have been a most unrewarding source for Soviet Intelligence'. 119 Much more detailed information had been freely available in newspapers. But generally, the State Department believed there was an absence of evidence because the Soviets had exercised great care in using intelligence obtained from American diplomatic traffic. 120 The break in American ciphers had been a significant intelligence asset, potentially of vital importance if a SovietAmerican hot war threatened, and the Soviets would have been very wary of compromising it by taking action that could be traced back to an American telegram. Of course Khrushchev had failed to adhere to this policy of selfdenial and the State Department thought the Soviet leader was 'doubtless guilty of a serious breach of security' when he blurted out his complaint to Kohler about West German steel piping. 121 The one instance where the State Department could tentatively connect a Soviet action to an American telegram came during the negotiations to end the Korean War and in this case the break into the embassy's traffic might have actually helped the United States. On 23 May 1953 the State Department sent a telegram to ambassador Bohlen in Moscow, secretly informing him that Washington was ready to terminate the negotiations and take stronger military measures if the communist powers rejected the final American proposal, which was about to be put forward at the Panmunjom armistice talks. 122 When Bohlen discussed the issue with the Soviet Foreign Minister on 28 May, he was deliberately vague about the likely American response, saying only that rejection of the proposal would lead: 'to the creation of a situation which the US Government was most sincerely and earnestly attempting to avoid'. 123 But if the Soviets had intercepted the telegram they would have known the seriousness of American intentions. On 4 June 1953 the communist states broadly accepted the American position and in its damage estimate the State Department speculated that the telegram to Bohlen: 'may have been the determining factor in prompting Moscow to accept a [Korean] settlement'. 124 Bugging was rife during the first half of the Cold War. At the Paris Summit in 1960, Macmillan remarked philosophically to Khrushchev that: 'In every Embassy in the world there were listening devices in the walls, or the ink stands, or the telephones'. 125 This was an exaggeration but it was an understandable one, for Soviet Bloc and Western intelligence services constantly tried to plant bugs in their opponents' diplomatic premises. On home ground the Soviets appear to have had greater success than the Americans or British although this could be a false impression caused by gaps in the historical record. There may be stories of successful bugging operations in Washington and London yet to be revealed. But Soviet security was tighter and it was easier for the KGB to penetrate Western embassies in Moscow than it was for the FBI and MI5 to gain access to Soviet missions. The Soviets benefitted from the legacy of the enforced relocation of diplomats to Kuibyshev during World War 2 and the employment of Soviet nationals as ancillary staff in Western embassies. The Americans, British and French could also be remarkably careless when it came to constructing new diplomatic premises behind the Iron Curtain and this problem persisted throughout the Cold War. A new American embassy in Moscow built in the 1980s by Soviet workmen was also found to be packed with sophisticated KGB listening devices. 126 Western intelligence services may have had more success in the developing world but not enough information is available at present to assess those operations.
After the discovery of the Great Seal device in 1952, the Americans and British did develop technical and procedural countermeasures against bugging, which culminated in the installation of secure rooms in their embassies in Moscow and other Soviet Bloc capitals. These countermeasures probably reduced the KGB's ability to eavesdrop on diplomats' sensitive conversations and dictation. But until the mid-1960s the Soviets were still able to gather a considerable amount of intelligence by using bugging to circumvent or help break the diplomatic ciphers of the American, British and West German embassies in Moscow and almost certainly those of other Western states. The evidence does support the claims by Andrew and Kahn that bugging greatly assisted Soviet Comint in the Cold War. In this way bugging was an important source of Moscow's diplomatic intelligence in the 1950s and early 1960s and its full impact on Cold War diplomacy has yet to be properly understood.
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